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<a> 2. Mini-publics: Design choices and legitimacy 
Clodagh Harris 
 
 
<b> Introduction 
 
Modern systems of governance that have depoliticised political life, privatised public 
resources, outsourced service provision and so on have served to distance citizens from the 
loci of power. These developments and others have contributed to the ‘democratic malaise’ 
evident in many industrialised democracies today and are comprehensively analysed by the 
co-editors in the introduction. 
 
One response to this ‘malaise’ has been the creation of democratic innovations that aim to 
enhance (that is, widen and deepen) citizen participation in political decision making.  The 
mini-public is one such innovation. 
 
Aiming to harness the views and ideas of citizens, mini-publics consist of groups of citizens 
that engage in facilitated deliberations on an issue and make public recommendations. 
Bridging the gap between deliberative democratic theory and practice, they have the 
potential to give citizens deeper levels of engagement at the agenda setting, decision-
making, and implementation stages of political processes. They may therefore contribute to 
more innovative policy solutions and more legitimate politics, as those affected by the 
decision have an input. Mini-publics may also improve implementation strategies, enhance 
democratic skills, and political education. Their success in achieving some or any of these 
hinges on their design and their links to ‘empowered spaces’, that is the institutions and 
actors that make political decisions (Dryzek, 2010). 
 
Referring to a wide range of international examples, this chapter seeks to provide a 
definition of what is meant by a mini-public and critically examines both normatively and 
empirically the micro and macro design choices available to those involved in establishing 
them with regard to input, throughput, and output legitimacy.  
 
 
<b> Mini-publics: what are they? 
 
The term mini-public stems from Dahl’s discussion of a deliberative ‘minipopulus’. In his 
seminal work on ‘Democracy and its Critics’ (1989), he asks us to  
Suppose an advanced democratic country were to create a ‘minipopulus’ consisting of 
perhaps a thousand citizens randomly selected out of the entire demos. Its task would be to 
deliberate, for a year perhaps, on an issue and then to announce its choices... One 
minipopulus could exist for each major issue on the agenda. A minipopulus could exist at any 
level of government – national, state or local. It could be attended ...by an advisory 
committee of scholars and specialists and by an administrative staff. It could hold hearings, 
commission research, and engage in debate and discussion… In these ways...the democratic 
process could be adapted once again to a world that little resembles the world in which 
democratic ideas and practices first came to light (Dahl, 1989). 
 
Much of what Dahl argued for in the minipopulus has come to pass, albeit in a variety of 
formats, on diverse issues, and with varying degrees of success. Few, however, have 
achieved the scale he envisaged: some notable exceptions include, 21st Century Town 
meetings (see Lukensmeyer, 2013) and Deliberative Opinion Polls (DOP) (see Fishkin, 2009). 
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It is argued that advances in technology, growing levels of digital literacy and internet access 
can also help achieve this (Farrar et al., 2010; Liston et al., 2013). 
 
Mini-publics are a contested entity, with multiple and often competing definitions.  Goodin 
and Dryzek, describe them as a group of citizens that is ‘small enough to be genuinely 
deliberative, and representative enough to be genuinely democratic’ (2006) while Grönlund, 
refers to them as, ‘forums in which lay citizens representing different viewpoints are 
gathered together to deliberate on a particular issue in small groups’ (2016). In their 
extensive review of the literature on mini-publics, Ryan and Smith (2014) note that 
definitions range from the expansive (Fung, 2003) to the restrictive (Fishkin, 2009), and offer 
their own ‘intermediate’ definition that characterises them as inclusive, representative ‘sub-
groups’ that involve structured, facilitated deliberation (2014).  
 
Citizens’ assemblies, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, DOPs, and planning cells are all 
types of mini-public (see Elstub, 2014; Escobar and Elstub, 2017). They vary in size, DOPs are 
usually the largest and citizens’ juries the smallest as summarised in Table 1, which also 
outlines how they differ in duration, selection method, activity, and output. Their use has 
become increasingly diffuse in recent decades and they can be found as far afield as Finland 
and Australia. Moreover, they haven’t been confined to liberal democracies, as witnessed in 
the emergence of ‘authoritarian deliberation’ in China (He and Warren, 2017). The increased 
use of deliberative polls (both off line and on line) at the lower levels of Chinese government 
have addressed a range of topics from ‘soft’ ones like tourism development to ‘hard’ ones 
like land appropriation, while scholarship in the field discusses the DOPs potential to 
contribute to democratisation there (see Fishkin et al., 2010; Jiang, 2010; He and Warren, 
2017). Regardless of location or regime type, mini-publics have in praxis taken a variety of 
forms on a wide range of issues at different levels of government (local, regional, national, 
supranational) and with varying degrees of impact.  
     
 
They have also differed in terms of initiation, agenda, processes, and powers. Some have 
deliberated on policy. Citizens’ juries, arguably the most widely used mini-public, have been 
used in a variety of policy contexts ranging from public health policy to environmental issues 
(see Timotijevic and Raats, 2007; Street et al., 2014; Roberts and Escobar, 2015). Others 
have discussed institutional, or wider issues, of what Olsen (2003) might refer to as 
‘constitutional gardening’, for example, the Dutch Burgerforum (2006), Ireland’s Convention 
on the Constitution (2012-2014) and Citizens’ Assembly (2016-2018) (see Fournier et al., 
2011; Farrell et al., 2017; Farrell et al., 2018).  
 
Some have taken a bottom up approach, for example, Iceland’s national forum (2009) and 
Estonia’s Citizens’ Assembly (2012) (see Landemore, 2015; Jonsson, 2015). Others have been 
more top down, for example, Ireland’s Convention on the Constitution, Ireland’s Citizens’ 
Assembly and the Canadian Citizens’ Assemblies, (see Fournier et al., 2011; Farrell et al., 
2017; Farrell et al., 2018). They have also experienced differing levels of impact. Some, 
primarily those that are established ‘outside’ the political system, have faced challenges in 
having their recommendations responded to or acted upon, while government initiated 
processes, such as, the Canadian Citizens’ Assemblies, have had their recommendations put 
straight to the wider citizenry in referendums, creating a more legitimate democratic 
process, by blending deliberative and direct democracy, and overcoming, as Saward argues, 
the deficiencies of each model (2001). 
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Despite their differences, mini-publics do have some features in common when it comes to 
format and process. All involve information gathering, (this may include presentations from 
academic/legal experts, stakeholders, witnesses) and small group-moderated deliberations 
that lead to some form of publicly presented opinion or recommendation.  
 
All include some form of random sampling to recruit participants, as they endeavour to act 
as a microcosm of society (see table 1). In this way they differ from democratic innovations 
such as, participatory budgeting, direct initiatives and so forth. DOPs, the largest mini-public, 
tend to use simple random sampling. Smaller mini-publics, such as, citizens’ juries, employ 
stratified random sampling techniques to ensure the sub group of lay citizens is broadly 
reflective of wider society in terms of gender, age, region, socio-economic status, and so on. 
Some have mixed, stratified random sampling with targeted recruitment, for example, 
Belgium’s G1000 (2011) to ensure inclusive representation (see Caluwaerts and Reuchamps, 
2016).   
 
Reflecting on the various definitions and how they’ve developed in praxis, this chapter 
defines mini-publics as a democratic innovation, in which a sub group of citizens (some of 
whom may be randomly or quasi-randomly selected) engage with experts, witnesses, 
advocates, stakeholders, and one another, in facilitated informed deliberations on a given 
matter, and publicly present their opinions and/or recommendations to their commissioning 
body and wider society. 
 
 
<b> Mini-publics and deliberative democracy 
Mini-publics have been described by Elstub as ‘the most advocated method to 
institutionalise deliberative democracy’ (2014), where deliberative democracy (this is 
discussed in greater detail in chapter X), is a theory of political legitimacy that argues that 
citizens should be given a more ‘central role’ in political processes (Goodin and Dryzek, 
2006). It contends that a political decision can be deemed legitimate if it can withstand 
scrutiny by those bound by it (Dryzek, 2007; Beetham, 2012) and involves equal 
participation, mutual respect, and reasoned argument (Rosenberg, 2007).  
 
There is no commonly agreed definition of deliberative democracy (Mutz, 2008; Niemeyer 
and Dryzek, 2007). Yet despite their differences, theorists broadly agree on deliberative 
democracy’s standard set of normative principles, equality, popular control, reasonableness 
and publicity (Held, 2006; Mansbridge at al., 2010; Parksinson, 2016).  
 
Deliberations are inclusive to the extent that they are open to those affected by a decision 
and should not advantage the politically engaged, the more educated, and the better off. It 
is also argued that participants should have equal opportunities, and resources to influence 
the process and exercise popular control (Smith, 2009; Mansbridge et al., 2010). Another 
defining feature of deliberative democratic processes is the focus on ‘reasonableness’, 
where participants justify their positions in a truthful and respectful manner, and are open 
to changing their preferences when faced with the ‘forceless force of the better argument’ 
(Habermas, 1975: 108). Finally, these processes should be conducted publiclyi.  
 
The focus on public ‘reasonableness’ by participants, is what differentiates deliberative 
democracy from other forms of democratic practice, such as, party competition, 
participatory democracy, and elite deliberation by political representatives and policy 
experts (Fishkin, 2009). Deliberative democratic theory focuses on ‘how people arrive at the 
“right” preferences and conceptions of interest – preferences, that is, that are adequately 
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considered and have passed the test of controversial argument and dialogue’ (Offe, 2014, 
p.435). It requires ordinary citizens to consider the arguments of differently situated and 
opinionated others, to present reasons for their own preferences, weigh up the arguments 
in ‘a context of good information’ (Isernia and Fishkin, 2014) and to be ‘amenable to 
changing their minds and their preferences as a result of reflection induced by deliberation’ 
(Dryzek, 2000). 
 
Arguably, mini-publics are not exclusively deliberative rather they endeavour to blend 
participatory and deliberative approaches to democracy, as reflected in their efforts to 
ensure inclusion, equality of voice and ‘reasonableness’.  
 
Both participatory and deliberative norms are captured in analyses of input, throughput and 
output legitimacy (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps, 2015; Suiter and Reuchamps, 2016), where:  
• input legitimacy is determined by who deliberates, what they deliberate on and 
epistemic completeness (access to information);  
• throughput legitimacy is influenced by the processes of participation, the decision 
making rules and contextual independence; and 
• output legitimacy hinges on the link between the mini and maxi publics. It examines: 
political uptake of the recommendation(s); feedback loops between the ‘empowered 
space’ and the mini-public; and social uptake of the process. 
 
 
<b> Mini-publics: micro design choices and legitimacy  
 
To what extent can we say that mini-publics enable genuine deliberation and achieve input, 
throughput, and output legitimacy? The answer lies partly in how they are designed. How 
participants are selected, how they participate and how they develop recommendations, 
determine their success in achieving input and throughput legitimacy. This involves micro 
design choices, such as, recruitment, the communication mode, decision-making rules, 
agenda setting powers, the subject and scope of deliberation, group composition, how 
experts are chosen, facilitation methods used and framing (Fung, 2003; Bächtiger et al., 
2014).  
 
Input legitimacy hinges on who has been recruited, and how they’ve been selected. 
Recruitment can involve sortition, stratified random sampling, discursive representation 
(often referred to as opinion representation), target groups or a mixture of the above.  The 
method chosen tends to depend on the size of the mini-public. Deliberative opinion polls 
typically recruit 100-500 participants (see Elstub 2014). Sortition/random sampling for larger 
groups such as these, have a greater probability of being a representative microcosm of 
wider society. Smaller mini-publics, such as, citizen juries and consensus conferences that, 
typically have 12-26 members, tend to employ quasi-random sampling techniques such as 
stratified sampling.  
 
To facilitate inclusion and political equality, a mini-public may also decide to target a 
particular group, usually a minority, that would not in all probability be picked up through 
random or stratified sampling. For example, the British Columbian Citizens’ Assembly (BCCA) 
having randomly recruited 158 participants (one male and one female per electoral district), 
realised that the process had produced no first nations’ representative and added one male 
and one female member from this community (Fournier et al., 2011). Belgium’s G1000 
specifically allocated 10% of its seats to those identified as ‘difficult to reach’, and worked 
with grassroots organisations to ensure ethnic minority groups and homeless people were 
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included (Caluwaerts and Reuchamps, 2016). All of these techniques assume that those 
participating in a given mini-public are representative in a descriptive sense. However, there 
are others who advocate for discursive representation, the inclusion of all the relevant 
discourses on a matter. This employs Q method (discussed in chapter Y) to identify the 
various discourses, and may involve the random selection of discourse leaders to ‘represent’ 
them (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). Interestingly, the Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit (2017) 
blended both demographic and opinion representation in terms of how members had voted 
in the referendum on Britain’s exit from the EU (Renwick et al., 2017). 
 
Whatever method chosen, there is always an element of self-selection to the extent that 
there is no compulsion to attend. Some mini-publics have been more successful than others 
at providing facilities that encourage and support attendance namely honoraria, free travel 
and accommodation, as well as childcare. It is customary that participants’ travel and 
accommodation expenses are covered. Payment of honoria, on the other hand, seems to 
vary from mini-public to mini-public. Both the Scottish citizens’ juries on wind farms (Roberts 
and Escobar, 2015) and the Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit paid members small stipends in 
recognition of their work (Renwick et al., 2017.) No such payment was offered to lay citizen 
members of the Irish Convention on the Constitution, or the Irish Citizens’ Assembly. 
 
Inclusion and political equality are not just about bringing someone to the table. They are 
also about ensuring equality of voice at that table, in keeping with Young’s concepts of 
internal and external inclusion (2000). The communication mode, the role of the facilitator, 
the group composition, decision making rules, the choice of experts, framing and the use of 
technology (Bächtiger et al., 2014) all have important roles in this regard.  
 
Successful deliberation does not require each person to speak for the same amount of time. 
Such rules would place a heavy burden on participants. Instead it requires that participants 
have opportunities to speak, to communicate with respect, to listen to differing opinions, to 
justify their own views, and to be open to changing their minds. Also, as Curato et al. 
observe, deliberative theory has ‘moved in the direction of recognising the plurality of 
speech cultures’ (2017, p.30). It can include narratives and rhetoric, but it should also 
include reasoning and justification at some stage in the process. 
 
Facilitators have a vital role to play in such small group deliberations. They can ensure that 
all members have the opportunity to contribute, that the tone of the discussions remains 
respectful, and no one member dominates the proceedings. It is the facilitator who can 
assist the group ‘reach its own goals’ and in so doing ensure ‘internal inclusion and 
pluralism’ (Landwehr, 2014). Good practice sees participants rotated over the course of the 
small group deliberations. This involves them moving from group to group to facilitate 
exposure to different views and experiences to avoid group think and potential individual 
dominance. 
 
The small group composition and the decision-making rules within them can have 
implications for voice within the process.  For example, women are one cohort that may be 
disadvantaged in such processes, as they tend to speak less than men, thereby having less 
influence and authority (Hansen, 2006; Karpowitz et al., 2012; Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 
2014; Gerber, 2015).  
 
Karpowitz and Mendelberg highlight the gendered aspects of deliberation in small group 
settings, finding that women are disadvantaged, and that this affects ‘everything from how 
long they speak, to the respect they are shown, to the content of what they say, to the 
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influence they carry, to their sense of their own capacity, and to their power over group 
decisions’ (2014). Using controlled experiments, they assess the impact of group 
composition and formal procedures, such as, decision-making rules on female participation 
(Mendelberg and Karpowitz, 2007; Karpowitz et al., 2012; Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2014). 
They discover that, group composition has an impact on gender deliberations, and if a 
process wishes to ‘to avoid maximum inequality, avoid groups with few women and majority 
rule’ (2012, p.545). Interestingly, recent empirical work on women’s rates of participation in 
mini-publics disproves aspects of the ‘gender gap’ argument (Gerber et al., 2016; Siu, 2017; 
Harris et al., 2018).  
 
Alternatives to majority rule include supermajorities and consensus. Traditionally, 
deliberative theorists have argued that deliberative processes should strive for consensus 
decisions.  However, ‘deliberative democrats have rarely endorsed consensus as an 
aspiration for real-world decision-making’ (Curato et al., 2017), recognising that a focus on 
consensus may prevent minority inclusion and restrict the scope for discourse (Young, 2000). 
More recently, theorists claim that deliberation should strive for meta-consensus (Niemeyer 
and Dryzek, 2007; Curato et al., 2017), where meta-consensus is an outcome of authentic 
deliberation and is defined as agreement on the domain of reasons and considerations 
relating to the issue at hand, as well as the nature of the available choices (Dryzek and 
Niemeyer, 2006).  
 
How the experts are identified and chosen, and the way in which their ‘expertise’ is 
presented, can have consequences for input and throughput legitimacy. Inclusive 
procedures give the members a role in identifying and selecting those they chose to present 
to them, for example, Danish Consensus Conferences (Smith, 2005). Those who provide 
expert evidence to mini-publics tend to come from the academic, legal, medical and/or 
public policy arenas. 
 
Inclusive deliberations require that information is presented in clear plain language. Also 
participants should be given the opportunity to question those sharing their expertise. Mini-
publics can use different formats to facilitate this. For the larger mini-publics, for example, in 
mini-publics of circa 100 or more members, participants can ask questions in the plenary 
sessions, and in some cases experts can be invited to join members during their private 
roundtable discussions, for example, Ireland’s Convention on the Constitution. This allows 
additional time for expert questioning, and facilitates expert input as deliberations progress. 
It also gives those reluctant to speak up in a crowded room an opportunity to pose their 
question(s). Possible disadvantages to this approach are that one table/group in the room 
has more information than others, and the risk of expert ‘manipulation’ is increased in a 
more informal, in camera setting. Ways of mitigating the disadvantages may involve the 
expert interrupting the small group deliberations briefly to publicly share the additional 
information with the wider group, and incorporating feedback from the small group 
discussions to the wider plenary sessions into the programme. 
 
Considering the role that diverse forms of speech can play in deliberations, it is not unusual 
for advocacy groups, and individual lay citizens who can share their stories of the ‘lived 
experience’ of a particular issue, to bring other perspectives to bear. As Young notes, 
narrative, rhetoric and greetings can facilitate inclusion, particularly of women and 
minorities, and in some cases a move from discussion to decision (2000). Ireland’s 
Convention on the Constitution and Citizens’ Assembly processes included evidence from 
advocacy groups and lay citizens . The weekend the Convention discussed the proposition to 
introduce marriage equality involved a panel discussion that included representatives of 
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different churches, as well as human rights and LGBT campaigning organisations. Those 
advocating for marriage equality invited the adult children of same sex couples to discuss 
their experiences, and to highlight their concerns about the lack of protection for their 
family under the Constitutionii. Similarly, young people under 18 were invited to address the 
Convention, the weekend they discussed reducing the voting ageiii, and members of the Irish 
diaspora highlighted their wish to have the right to vote in Irish elections via Panopto, the 
weekend that topic was addressed. Testimony was also part of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly’s 
deliberations. When considering the highly sensitive topic of abortion, its members 
requested that women who had terminated pregnancies were invited to share their 
experiences with them anonymouslyiv. 
 
Embedding expertise in sometimes tight schedules can prove a challenge for those designing 
mini-publics. The balance between providing sufficient, relevant and competing information 
in a concise, accessible manner, and allowing time for questions and small group 
deliberations can be tight (see Roberts and Escobar, 2015). It can be difficult for one day or 
indeed weekend events to achieve this, particularly if the topic for consideration is weighty 
and/or sensitive. An example of best practice is the BCCA. It involved a learning phase, 
where over the course of 6 weekends, the members heard evidence from a range of experts. 
This was followed by the public hearing phase that involved 50 public meetings across the 
province to gather public opinion on the issue, with the final phase focusing on small group 
deliberations (Fournier et al., 2011).  
 
Another crucial issue when considering invited expertise, in terms of throughput legitimacy, 
is the diversity of the perspectives presented to ensure competing arguments are included. 
The need for a greater plurality of expert views was highlighted by international observers of 
Belgium’s G1000 process, who found that ‘the experts who introduced the three themes 
approached the matter from a somewhat ‘left-wing’ oriented perspective. Therefore, their 
input did not necessarily represent the full diversity of the viewpoints on these themes’v. 
However, they concluded that the results on the day did not indicate any undue influence 
from the expertsvi.  
 
Other issues that can impact on the deliberation’s framing are the topic(s) for discussion, 
how they are worded, and the degree to which the mini-public may deviate from, or reframe 
that issue to explore supplementary issues, or indeed request more time in which to do so.  
How technology is employed can also impact framing, for example, the algorithms used to 
synopsise on line deliberations. 
 
Technology can play a crucial role in up-scaling deliberation and has been used innovatively 
in a number of mini-publics. The G1000 Belgian citizens’ summit is an excellent example of 
an approach that blended online and face-to-face engagement. Beginning with a website to 
gather Belgian’s views on the political issues that mattered most to them, it then clustered 
these into themes and asked people to vote on them. The top three were discussed at a 
one-day citizens’ summit in Brussels that included over 700 randomly selected citizens. On 
the same day, people who were not selected to attend the event in Brussels could 
participate online either at home (G-homes), or offsite at civil society organised meetings (G-
offs), using the interactive software Synthetronvii. Their opinions and recommendations 
were fed back into the main hall. Also members of the G-homes and the G-offs were part of 
the G32, the group of 32 members that took the recommendations from the one-day 
summit and developed them further over a number of weekends.  The Estonian Citizens’ 
Assembly process, similarly combined online and offline approaches to deliberation and 
participation, using a crowdsourcing website to gather information and opinion on five pre-
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selected topics. It received 2000 original proposals and 4000 comments on them (Jonsson, 
2015). These were categorised and deliberated upon by citizens, political representatives 
and experts in deliberative seminars, that culminated in 18 proposals that were ‘handed 
over for further deliberation on the Rahvakogu (deliberation day)’, at which 314 randomly 
selected citizens participated (Jonsson, 2015).  
 
Concerns have been expressed that the use of the internet for political purposes can 
reinforce existing inequalities and the dominance of the technologically competent 
(Albrecht, 2006). There is also a gendered dimension, as men are more likely to participate 
in online political discussions (Miller et al., 1999). Bua finds that when it comes to online 
participation ‘flooders’ tend to be men, while women are more likely to lurk and not 
participate (2009).  Another challenge is securing the inclusion of young people in 
knowledge creation, as policy making and sources of information become more complex 
(Margetts, 2009). Liston et al. advocate an approach to inclusion in e-deliberations, and 
highlight the specific role for the designer to ensure that the means used to engage the 
crowd are collaborative, intuitive, and relevant to people’s needs and capacities (2013). 
 
The discussion to date has focused on what has been termed the micro design aspects of 
mini-publics and how they relate to input and throughput legitimacy by considering who 
participates, how they participate and how they develop recommendations looking at both 
internal (voice) and external (representation) inclusion. It now turns to output legitimacy, 
the mini-public’s relationship with the maxi-public, namely decision makers and wider 
society. This involves addressing, what has been referred to as, macro design choices 
namely: who initiates the mini-publics; who sets the agenda; levels of empowerment; 
responsiveness of the ‘empowered’ space; levels of dissemination to the wider citizenry; and 
monitoring and reiteration (Fung, 2003; Bächtiger et al., 2014). 
 
 
<b> Mini-publics: macro design choices and legitimacy 
 
Mini-publics have been established by a variety of actors, including: (a) supranational 
organisations, for example, EuroPolis DOP (2009), (Gerber, 2015; Gerber et al., 2016); (b) 
national governments, for example, Iceland’s national gathering (2010), (Landemore, 2015); 
(c) regional governments, for example, the Canadian Citizens’ Assemblies; (d) local 
governments, for example, the City of Greater Bendigo citizens’ jury (2016)viii, Australia; (e) 
public sector bodies, for example, the NHS Citizens’ Assembly ix, (2015) (Farmer, 2015); (f) 
civil society organisations, for example, the Citizens’ Forum Portugalx, (2016) (Serrano and 
Jardim de Oliveria, 2017) ; (g) academics, for example, Finnish mini-publics, (see Grönlund, 
2016): and (h) a mixture, for example, Australia Citizens’ Parliament, (Dryzek, 2009).  
 
The initiator usually determines the agenda, and may decide how tightly the group need to 
adhere to it to it, or whether it may be expanded.  Belgium’s G1000, Estonia’s Citizens’ 
Assembly and Ireland’s Convention on the Constitution, show how technology can be used, 
to a greater or lesser extent, to crowdsource the agenda (Jonsson, 2015; Jacquet et al., 
2016; Suiter et al., 2016). 
 
The initiator also determines the resources available to achieve many of the micro design 
elements, such as, the length of the mini-public, honoraria, childcare facilities, technology 
used, facilitator training, international expertise, the quality of the materials produced, 
regional meetings, public relations professionals, marketing and so onxi. These can influence 
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the maxi-public’s perceptions of the openness, inclusivity and power of the process, if they 
are even aware of the process. 
 
Studies of mini-publics are also concerned with their impact in wider political systems, that 
is, their relationship with the institutions that actually make political decisionsxii (empowered 
spaces), and the public at large (Newton 2012; Bächtiger et al., 2014; Hendriks 2016).  There 
is always the concern that mini-publics may be used as tokenistic consultative exercises, 
where decision makers cherry pick those recommendations that suit/are politically 
acceptable (Böker and Elstub 2015), and may be a way of deferring  a decision on a 
contentious issue.  Goodin and Dryzek note, that in terms of wider impact, mini-publics ‘at 
most, and very rarely, …. have a politically (but not constitutionally) guaranteed place in 
policy making on a particular issue. The more usual case is that mini-publics lack formal 
power or authority in the macro-political system’ (2006). They outline pathways of influence 
that include: actual policy making, being taken up in the policy process, informing public 
debate, shaping policy/market testing, legitimating policy, confidence/constitution building, 
oversight and resisting co-option. 
 
Mini-publics have varying degrees of success from the perspective of output legitimacy. In 
some cases, governments have pledged to put a forum’s recommendations directly to the 
people, in the form of a referendum. This was the case for the Canadian Citizens’ 
Assemblies. However, the regional government as initiator also determined the thresholds 
for success. In the case of the BCCA, its recommendation faced the challenge of achieving 
double supermajorities in the subsequent referendum. It achieved a simple majority in 77 of 
the Province’s 79 ridings, but it only won 57.4% of the total vote, falling short of the required 
60%. In contrast, many of the Irish Constitutional Convention’s recommendations have been 
or are due to be implemented (Farrell, 2018)xiii. It led to the achievement of two world firsts. 
On May 22nd 2015, Ireland became the first country in the world to support the introduction 
of marriage equality by popular vote. It was also the first time a recommendation from a 
deliberative mini-public resulted in Constitutional changexiv. More recently the Irish Citizens’ 
Assembly’s recommendation to repeal and replace the 8th amendment to the Irish 
Constitution (the amendment relating to the abortion) passed a popular referendum xv. The 
Estonian case is also interesting, as its Parliament implemented 3 of the 15 proposals that 
stemmed from the citizens’ assembly process (Jonsson, 2015).   
 
Other mini-publics that may not be deemed successes in terms of recommendation 
implementation, have achieved impact in terms of increasing awareness of their process, 
and the uptake of that process by other groups, nationally and internationally. Belgium’s 
G1000 process has influenced similar smaller deliberative mini-publics in Belgium and the 
Netherlands (Jacquet et al., 2016). Interestingly, Ireland’s Convention on the Constitution 
and the subsequent Citizens’ Assembly were heavily influenced by the ‘We the Citizens’ pilot 
Citizens’ Assembly, which essentially proved to the political classes that deliberation could 
work in an Irish context (We the Citizens, 2011). 
 
Research on deliberative democracy and deliberative mini-publics has developed an array of 
tools to measure deliberation and its impact on those who participate in such processes. The 
most notable is the Discourse Quality Index (DQI), which aims to operationalise and measure 
the core features of Habermasian discourse ethics, by coding discourses on participation, 
levels of justification for demands, respect and constructive politics (Steenberger et al., 
2003; Steiner et al., 2004). It has been amended in recent years to storytelling (Steiner, 
2012). Some other approaches to empirical analysis of deliberation include: Fishkin’s 
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deliberative opinion poll (2009), and Stromer-Galley’s measurement of deliberative content 
(2007).  
 
Research in the field shows that citizens, as a consequence of deliberation, become more 
informed, and as a result more likely to change their positions on a given policy issue. They 
also find that deliberation has led to changes in opinion, voting intentions, interest in public 
dialogue, collective consistency, civic capacities and efficacy (Fishkin, 2009; Farrar et al., 
2010; Farrell et al., 2013; Offe, 2014). Similarly, studies of small group deliberations in mini-
publics, revealed high levels of deliberative quality in terms of respect, empathy, reason-
giving and orientation towards the common good (Gerber et al., 2016), as well as increased 
trust in politicians and democratic institutions, and satisfaction with democracy (Grönlund, 
2016,). This research has primarily, and often exclusively, focused on the impact the mini-
public has on its members. Fewer findings exist on their impact on the wider citizenry. In 
their work on the Canadian citizens’ assemblies, Fournier et al. (2011) found that few people 
knew something about the assemblies, and many were misinformed about their 
composition and processes. While Elkink et al.’s (2017) study of the Irish marriage equality 
referendum campaign found that respondents from the wider citizenry had good levels of 
awareness of the convention’s composition, and a significant majority of them (77 per cent), 
knew that the convention had recommended a referendum on marriage equality. 
Interestingly, ‘voters who were knowledgeable about the convention and the role that it 
played in bringing about the referendum were more likely to vote yes’ (Elkink et al 2017).  
 
Although examined separately in this chapter, primarily for ease of discussion, micro and 
macro design choices are in fact interlinked. For example, who initiates them and how 
prescriptive they are may impact on: recruitment; modes of discussion; group composition; 
decision-making rules; resources; empowerment; and responsiveness to recommendations. 
This analysis begs the question as to whether it is realistic,or even fair to expect high levels 
of impact from a mini-public. It is, after all, but one part of a wider democratic system of 
governance.  
 
It is widely recognised that all deliberative norms cannot be met in any one institution at the 
same time and in the same place (Goodin, 2005; Parkinson, 2005; Warren, 2007; Smith, 
2009; Mansbridge et al., 2012; Felicettie et al., 2015).  This is captured in recent systemic 
analyses of deliberative democracy that recognise that ‘the entire burden of decision-
making and legitimacy does not fall on one forum or institution but is distributed among 
different components in different cases’ (Mansbridge et al., 2012), where deliberation may 
be sequential across complementary institutions, at different stages in a policy process 
(Goodin, 2005; Parkinson, 2005; Warren, 2007). This systemic approach is not without its 
critics who argue that it risks being elitist and losing its ‘normative moorings’ (Owen and 
Smith, 2015, p.218).  
 
 
<b>Conclusion 
 
Deliberation is ‘fragile’ (Warren, 2007). In praxis it has to work within real word systems 
marked by asymmetries in power, wealth, knowledge, access to information and so on.  As 
Bohman argues, it ‘cannot assume that citizens are similarly situated or similarly capable of 
making use of their opportunities and resources.’ (1997). Consequently, deliberative 
processes must be designed in such a way to satisfy the demanding requirements of political 
equality.  
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Acknowledging that a mini-public is but part of a wider democratic system of governance, it 
can nonetheless play a role in overcoming some of these asymmetries, through careful and 
considered design choices that embed inclusion (internal and external) and popular control 
at all stages in the process. Actors ‘in and around deliberative processes’ can play a part in 
addressing inequalities (Curato et al., 2017) through careful attention to recruitment (mixed 
methods that include some random sampling and targeted approaches might work best for 
external inclusion), as well as serious consideration of the tone, format and procedures of 
deliberative processes and system responsiveness. 
 
For mini-publics to achieve their participatory and deliberative potential in terms of input, 
throughput and output legitimacy, political elites need to empower them by: properly 
resourcing them; permitting open agenda setting; committing to prompt and constructive 
responses to their output; and monitoring them. This will require the ‘empowered space’ 
itself to engage deliberatively with mini-publics.  
 
<b>Further Reading 
 
Elstub, S. and P. McLaverty, (eds) (2014), Deliberative Democracy: Issues and Cases, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
 
Escobar, O. and S. Elstub (2017), ‘Forms of mini-publics’, Research and Development Note, 
Canberra: newDemocracy. 
 
Grönlund, K., A. Bächtiger,and M. Setälä (eds) (2014), Deliberative mini-publics involving 
citizens in the democratic process, Colchester, Essex: ECPR press. 
 
Reuchamps, M. and J, Suiter (eds) (2016), Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe, 
Colchester, Essex: ECPR Press. 
 
Roberts, J. and O. Escobar (2015), ‘Involving communities in deliberation: A study of 3 
citizens’ juries on onshore wind farms in Scotland’ accessed 18 December 2017 at 
www.climatexchange.org.uk/files/5614/3213/1663/Citizens_Juries_-_Full_Report.pdf. 
 
The Participedia database accessed 18 December 2017 at www. participedia.net/en.  
 
 
<b> Notes 
 
i Scholars note that publicity can have perverse effects (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Chambers, 
2004), an argument reflected to some extent in the examples discussed where closed, small group 
discussions facilitated open and frank engagement as well as affording privacy for participants to 
transform their opinions should that be the case. 
ii See footage of the GLEN et al. presentation to the Convention, accessed 18 December 2017 at 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=LRcu-Qr0Xxk. 
iii See footage of the NYCI presentations accessed 18 December 2017 at 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=YF3EXxc8OzE. 
iv See the Feedback from the roundtable brainstorming session at the first weekend of the Citizens’ 
Assembly https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/Meetings/Feedback-on-Member-Brainstorming-in-
First-Weekend1.pdf , accessed 19 September 2018. 
v The author was a member of the international observer team. 
vi The International observers’ report, accessed 18 December 2017 at 
http://www.g1000.org/documents/7_The_G1000_report_by_international_observers_EN.pdf 
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vii See https://www.synthetron.com/wp-content/uploads/Synthetron-CASE-Citizens-crowdsourcing-
Hybrid-meeting-The-G1000-case-vs-11112011.4JCCS-EN.pdf , accessed 19 September 2018. 
viii For more information, accessed 13 February 2017 at www.bendigo.vic.gov.au/your-say/Have-your-
say/Citizens-Jury.  
ix For more information, see Farmer, H. (2016), accessed 13 February 2017, at 
www.involve.org.uk/blog/2016/02/04/full-reports-of-nhs-citizen-assembly-and-citizens-jury-now-
published. 
x For more information, see Serrano, M. and L. Jardim de Oliveria (2017), accessed 13 February 2017, 
at www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/manuel-nunes-ramires-serrano-louren-o-jardim-de-
oliveira/citizens-forum-revisiting. 
xi . For example, the Irish Convention on the Constitution had a limited budget (approximately 
€900,000) when compared with similar bodies such as the British Columbian Citizens’ Assembly (Can$ 
5.5 million) and the Dutch Burgerforum (€5.1 million). 
xii The concept of coupling, that is the relationship between different parts of the deliberative system 
(see Mansbridge et al., 2012), has emerged in academic analyses of the impact of mini-publics with a 
discussion of how ‘loose’ or ‘tight’ these links between the mini-public and other sites, particularly 
empowered ones, within the deliberative system should be (see Hendriks, 2016; Setala, 2017) 
xiii Including a third popular referendum on the removal of the offense of blasphemy from the Irish 
Constitution due on October 26th 2018. 
xiv On the same day a referendum was held to reduce the age of presidential candidates. In the midst 
of the deliberation over marriage equality it had received little attention and following a lacklustre 
campaign was defeated by 73.1% against to 26.9% in favour 
xv For background to the referendum see Harris, C (2018) Bridging Representative and Direct 
Democracy? Ireland’s Citizens’ Assembly https://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blog/bridging-
representative-and-direct-democracy-irelands-citizens-assemblies accessed 19 September 2018.  For 
information on the referendum see RTE exit poll at https://www.rte.ie/news/2018/0525/965899-
eighth-amendment/ accessed 19 September 2018. 
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